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The paper provides a general evaluation of infl ation targeting in Poland with some reference to 
challenges faced by major central banks. First, it argues that infl ation targeting has proved to be 
relatively successful in Poland and attributes this success to a bias towards the aggressive mitiga-
tion of infl ationary risks, whenever they have arisen. Second, it briefl y explains why the National 
Bank of Poland does not need to search for an alternative to infl ation targeting. Then, it presents the 
negative aspects of the price level targeting and nominal GDP targeting. Third, it refers to the post-
EU accession experience of Poland as being supportive for the “leaning against the wind” approach 
to monetary policy conducting. Fourth, it argues that such an approach is supported by evidence 
on the effects of the crisis’ outburst and aggressive interest rate cuts on trust in central banks. Fifth, 
it indicates the determinants of slow post-crisis restructuring and persistently high uncertainty as 
desired priorities in the research agenda in central banks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the global economy contracted for the first time since the end of the 
Second World War. Its subsequent recovery has been sluggish by histori-
cal standards. Still worse, in many countries the recovery has also been frag-
ile. This poor performance was preceded by two decades of considerable de-
cline in output volatility, a period dubbed “the Great Moderation”. This stark 
contrast between the two periods in terms of macroeconomic stability raises 
a natural question of whether (or not) to introduce any changes to monetary policy. 
Based on this experience, many researchers (e.g. Bini Smaghi 2013; Whelan 2013) 
formulate highly critical views on hitherto monetary policy, especially inflation 
targeting.1 While some conclusions regarding monetary policy may be of the gen-
eral nature, in our opinion, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of monetary 
policy on the country level, rather than to form an overall assessment. We address 
this question with respect to Poland. While publications such as Polański (2000), 
Horská (2002), and Łyziak (2005) do assess inflation targeting in Poland, they 
were all published before the outburst of the 2007 financial crisis. We update this 
assessment with post-crisis conclusions using a similar evaluation methodology. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a general 
assessment of inflation targeting in Poland. Section 3 considers possible alterna-
tives to inflation targeting. Section 4 analyses the role of monetary policy in en-
suring financial stability. Section 5 raises some issues regarding monetary policy 
communication, while Section 6 outlines challenges to the research agenda in 
central banks. Section 7 concludes. 
2. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF INFLATION TARGETING IN POLAND
Inflation targeting (IT) in Poland was officially adopted in 1998, i.e. relatively 
early in comparison with the majority of other emerging economies. It was im-
plemented after several years of gradual disinflation, when inflation reached 10% 
and remained at that level. Unlike in many other emerging economies, a free float, 
a necessary element of that strategy, was not introduced under market pressure. 
Poland is a rare example of a smooth transition from peg to free float. Interesting-
ly, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) had been discouraged from the adoption of 
1  Bini Smaghi (2013) neatly summarises his views in the following statement: “inflation target-
ing has not worked, it has not prevented the financial crisis. It is not providing an efficient 
monetary-policy strategy to get the economy out from the crisis.” We are grateful to the anon-
ymous referee for drawing our attention to this particular quotation.
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IT, especially by international financial institutions (e.g. Christoffersen – Wescott 
1998). According to the IMF (1999), it was too early for Poland to adopt it, as the 
relationship between policy-determined interest rates, monetary aggregates, and 
inflation was not yet clear.
In spite of the number of concerns raised by those institutions, all in all IT in 
Poland has proved to be relatively successful. It facilitated reducing inflation 
from moderate to low and allowed maintaining price stability thereafter (Figure 
1). Before 2004, new inflation targets were set every year. Since the introduction 
of a continuous inflation target, set at 2.5% in 2004, inflation deviations from the 
target have been on average moderate relative to other countries and the volatil-
ity of both inflation and aggregate demand as well as the variability of nominal 
interest rates have both been low (Figure 2).
IT was not always successful. As the IMF (2002) pointed out, Poland, as well 
as its peers, demonstrated a high rate of missing inflation targets, particularly in 
the early 2000s (Table 1). These misses, were caused, among other factors, by 
technical shortcomings of design, i.e. narrow bands, relatively short time policy 
horizons, and the volatility of the targeted inflation. It is worth also mention-
ing that monetary policy considered excessively tight was blamed for having 
contributed to a sharp increase in unemployment at the beginning of the 2000s 
(e.g. Kwiatkowski et al. 2002; Ciżkowicz – Rzońca 2003 for a contrary view). 
Figure 1. Annual CPI inflation in Poland (%, 1990–2013)
Source: Central Statistical Office (CSO), NBP.
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Nevertheless, we note that short-term costs related to monetary policy decisions 
are unavoidable due to the conditions (uncertainty) in which such decisions are 
taken (e.g. Issing 2002). This uncertainty is particularly high in the case of coun-
tries undergoing substantial transformations. Despite these costs, with the ben-
efit of long-term hindsight, and compared to other countries, Polish experience 
with IT may be assessed as successful.
Figure 2. Central banks’ performance in terms of inflation and output gap volatility 
Source: CSOs, NBP calculations.
Table 1. Inflation targets and inflation in Poland (%, 1999–2013)
Year Target Actual Year Target Actual
1999 6.4–7.8 9.8 2007 1.5–3.5 2.5
2000 5.4–6.8 8.5 2008 1.5–3.5 4.2
2001 6–8 3.6 2009 1.5–3.5 3.5
2002 4–6 0.8 2010 1.5–3.5 2.6
2003 2–4 1.7 2011 1.5–3.5 4.3
2004 1.5–3.5 3.5 2012 1.5–3.5 3.7
2005 1.5–3.5 2.1 2013 1.5–3.5 0.9 
2006 1.5–3.5 1.0 2013 1.5–3.5 0.0 
Source: CSO.
Note: Since 2004, the inflation target is continuous and amounts to 2.5 +/- percentage points. End of period 
consumer prices until 2003 and average consumer prices thereafter. Italics denote the years when targets were 
reached.
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Our hypothesis is that the reason for the success has been a bias towards a 
tighter policy to mitigate inflationary risks whenever they arise. This was par-
ticularly visible at the early stages of IT. The asymmetric approach to upside 
and downside risk, respectively, has been the opposite of the approach applied 
in practice by at least some central banks in advanced economies. With inflation 
expectations well anchored, the central banks reacted aggressively whenever a 
downside risk to aggregate demand occurred, and appeared to be much more 
comfortable with upside risk to aggregate demand (e.g. Taylor 2009.)
3. ALTERNATIVES TO INFLATION TARGETING
Zero lower bound (ZLB), which has constrained interest rate policy in major 
advanced economies, has revived a debate on alternatives to IT. Reviewing all ar-
guments used in this debate is far beyond the scope of this section. Let us simply 
raise some problems with the monetary policy conducted in Poland (as well as in 
the eurozone and in the United States).  
In theory, both price level targeting (PLT) and nominal GDP targeting are bet-
ter suited to cope with the ZLB, provided that inflation is below the target. How-
ever, in the case of Poland, the risk of the ZLB becoming a binding constraint 
is negligible, as long as potential output grows relatively fast (Table 2) and the 
financial sector remains healthy (Table 3). Thus, natural interest rate is comfort-
ably high and unlikely to fall into risky territory. For example, Brzoza-Brzezina 
(2006) concludes that the natural interest rate for Poland in the period of 1998–
2004 averaged between 4.6% and 5.0%. Despite the above fact, interest rates 
in Poland were reduced to 2%. This is the limit below which it is customary to 
view interest rates as close to zero. Historically, this limit has not been breached 
frequently. As reported in Homer – Sylla (2005), in the 20th century, interest rates 
were maintained close to zero primarily after the Great Depression and under 
the conditions of war economy (as well as the transformation away from war 
economy). Outside of the US, interest rates were held close to zero in Switzerland 
in the period of 1937–1956 (as well as of 1973–1978 and 1996–1999), in France 
in 1941–1946, in New Zealand in 1941–1953 and in Canada in 1944–1950. In the 
remaining countries, interest rates were not lowered below 2% in the 20th century 
(in most cases, the lower limit was higher than 2%).
It is also worth noting that if PLT had been introduced in Poland instead of 
fully-fledged IT that would have implied a difference in monetary conditions in 
comparison to actual ones only after the outburst of the global financial crisis 
(Figure 3). In our opinion, policy tightening required to offset the effects of both 
negative supply shocks (i.e. of sharp increases in energy and food prices) and the 
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Figure 3. Price level targeting in Poland and the eurozone. Price level compared 
to the cumulated inflation target
Source: CSOs, Eurostat, NBP calculations.
Table 3. Financial soundness indicators Poland vs. the eurozone (%, 2007–2008)
Country–Region Indicator name 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Eurozone Bank nonperforming 
loans to total gross 
loans 
2.0 2.6 4.7 5.3 5.8 6.4 6.4
Poland 5.2 2.8 4.3 4.9 4.7 5.2 5.0
Eurozone Bank capital to assets 
ratio
6.6 6.1 6.4 6.0 5.4 5.8 6.9
Poland 8.0 7.5 8.1 8.2 7.8 8.7 9.0
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Table 2. Potential GDP volume (percentage change on preceding year, 2000–2016)
 5-year averages     
Autumn 2014 
forecast
Spring 2014 
forecast
 
2000–
2004
2005–
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015
Poland 4.0 3.7 4.1 4.2 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.4
Estonia 5.5 3.8 –0.4 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.8
Latvia 6.6 5.3 –2.0 –0.9 0.4 1.6 2.1 2.6 3.2 2.3 2.9
Lithuania 6.0 5.0 –0.1 0.7 1.1 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.7
Slovakia 3.8 5.2 3.7 3.8 2.9 .24 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.5
Czech Rep. 2.8 3.8 1.6 1.5 0.5 0.5 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.1 1.3
Eurozone 2.1 1.5 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8
Source: European Economic Forecast Autumn 2014 (European Economy 7/2014).
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considerable depreciation of Polish currency on the price level would have been 
a worse response to the crisis than the monetary policy loosening that actually 
took place in Poland.
In the eurozone, PLT adopted together with the euro would have meant tighter 
monetary conditions. We believe that such conditions (if feasible, taking into 
account the monetary policy stance in the United States and capital mobility) 
would have decelerated the accumulation of imbalances in some eurozone pe-
riphery economies, notably in Ireland and Spain. Yet, if it had been introduced in 
2008, it would have required a more aggressive monetary loosening, i.e. more un-
conventional monetary policy measures. Such a loosening would certainly have 
come at a cost. The risks created by unconventional monetary policy measures 
are analysed in depth e.g. by Borio (2012), Ciżkowicz – Rzońca (2014), Hannoun 
(2012), Rajan (2013), and White (2012).                 
As far as nominal GDP targeting is concerned, it appears unfeasible when 
taking into account both frequent and large revisions of nominal GDP. In recent 
years, these revisions were usually larger in the eurozone and the United States 
than in Poland (Figure 4). Nominal GDP could hardly serve as nominal anchor in 
either of these economies. 
Figure 4. Nominal GDP targeting. Difference between the first estimate of quarterly nominal GDP 
and the following estimates (2007Q1–2011Q2) (absolute values)
Source: Eurostat, NBP calculations.
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4. APPROACH TO FINANCIAL STABILITY
We believe that central banks should lean against the wind. This is the best way 
to avoid ugly deflations, which so many central bankers have been afraid of. So 
far, they have occurred only after financial crises (more on this, see, e.g. Bordo 
– Filardo 2005.) 
One may agree that interest rate is a blunt instrument to deal with financial sta-
bility. However, over the period of financial imbalances’ accumulation, when the 
substitutability of various assets and various liabilities increases, there is hardly 
any instrument which could be effectively used in a targeted way. One may look 
at this problem from a political economy perspective. If there was no monetary 
policy reaction to excessive credit growth, the macroprudential policy would have 
to be tightened. Yet, a strong macroprudential response when monetary authority 
hesitates to respond decisively seems hardly plausible.
Let us refer once again to the Polish experience. After the EU accession, Po-
land was considered a growth laggard among the New Member States (NMS) 
until the outburst of the global financial crisis (Figure 5). The relatively poor 
growth performance of Poland in 2004–2008 was caused partly by sharp mon-
etary policy tightening, which contributed to the interruption of the post-EU ac-
cession boom. The tightening was perceived as a mistake by some international 
institutions, e.g. the IMF, who noted that its effects would be delayed and that a 
higher inflation target would better accommodate the Balassa–Samuelson effect 
Figure 5. GDP in EU New Member States: pre- and post-crisis comparison 
Source: Balcerowicz et al. (2013).
Notes: Cumulative GDP growth vs. change in domestic credit to the private sector.
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(see IMF Country Reports Nos. 04/217 and 06/391). Poland became a growth 
leader among the NMS only after the Lehman collapse, despite the fact that 
Polish propelling institutions were weaker than in many countries of the CEE re-
gion, particularly the Baltic States (Balcerowicz – Rzońca 2015).2 Since the pre-
crisis boom in Poland had been short-lived, it did not end up in a severe recession 
when it bust, contrary to what happened elsewhere in the region. Actually, there 
was no recession at all in Poland.
It appears that central banks in advanced economies largely neglected risks for 
sustainable economic growth stemming from excessive credit dynamics, while 
overestimating its role in post-crisis recovery. On the contrary, many researchers 
indicate that credit growth is not a precondition of economic rebound and that 
credit-less recoveries are rather natural after the bursting of a speculative bubble 
driven by excessive credit expansion (for more on this, see e.g. Bech et al. 2012; 
Takáts – Upper 2013). Sweden (and the Nordic countries in general), is just an 
example of such a recovery after the crisis in the early 1990s (Figure 6). A post-
crisis economy requires, above all, restructuring to recover. A non-restructured 
banking sector may postpone deleveraging via forbearance, but forbearance lend-
ing is likely to crowd viable enterprises out of credit (e.g. Caballero et al. 2008; 
Peek – Rosengren 2005).               
5. MONETARY POLICY COMMUNICATION
The central bank needs to be trusted in order to effectively communicate with 
economic agents and, ultimately, to stabilise their expectations, and thereby – the 
economy. Using models, economists conventionally assume that central banks 
are trusted and thus their policy announcements are credible. However, this is 
only an assumption, whose correctness ought to be verified and may change. 
It seems to reflect reality in Poland. Since the successful disinflation at the be-
ginning of the transition, the NBP has been continuously among the most trusted 
Polish institutions (Figure 7). On the other hand, there is growing evidence that a 
crisis may severely hit trust in the central bank, even one having a seemingly well 
established reputation (Figure 8 illustrates this claim). Thus, the high trust in the 
NBP could have easily disappeared if the effects of the global financial crisis had 
turned out not to be as mild as they actually were in Poland. The detrimental ef-
2  GDP growth rate in the Baltic states was higher than in Poland in the years 2011–2013. How-
ever, it had been preceded by a dramatic (14–18%) drop in GDP of these countries in 2010. 
Additionally, the potential GDP of the Baltic states was lower than in Poland throughout this 
period.
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Figure 7. Net trust (2005–2012)
Source: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (Centre for Public Opinion Research).
Notes: Trust in Polish Parliament, President, Courts, NBP and Warsaw Stock Exchange (GPW).
Figure 6. Pre- and post-crisis growth in credit
Source: Balcerowicz et al. (2013).
Notes: Credit to GDP ratio in the EU, the US and some selected countries during 5 selected episodes of the 
banking crisis.
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fects of crisis occurrence on trust in the central bank provide yet another support 
for the “leaning against the wind” approach to pursuing monetary policy because 
without trust, it is difficult for the central bank to “mop-up after”.
Furthermore, a decrease in trust in the central bank may not be caused only by 
its failure to prevent a crisis outburst. It may also be driven by economic agents’ 
conviction that the cure applied by the central bank is inappropriate. Still worse, 
such a conviction may arise even if the central bank’s response to the crisis occur-
rence is entirely standard and involves aggressive interest rate cuts. Albinowski et 
al. (2014), who study links between trust in the ECB and its interest rate policy, 
find that when households have pessimistic expectations, aggressive cuts in in-
terest rates are followed by a decline in trust in the ECB (Table 4). This puzzling 
result supports the “lack-of-confidence” hypothesis developed by Schmitt-Grohé 
and Uribe (2010 and 2012), and calls into question the conventional “fundamen-
tal-shock” hypothesis which, if correct, would imply a positive effect of aggres-
sive cuts on trust in the ECB. Thus, the scope for the “mop-up after” approach to 
conducting monetary policy may be even narrower than one would assume based 
on the dependence of trust in the central bank on successful crisis prevention.
Figure 8. Net trust in the European Central Bank and the European Commission 
(an unweighted average for the euro zone 12)
Source: Eurobarameter.
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This last observation leads us to challenges ahead of central banks. We focus on 
challenges to the research agenda in central banks, rather than on challenges ahead 
of pursuing monetary policy. With regard to the latter issue, we would not be origi-
nal by claiming that the largest current challenge is to exit from unconventional 
measures in the right order and in the right time. Taking into account that concerns 
Table 4. Monetary policy communication
Variable
Model 3
OLS DK RE FE DK FE
EC net trust
0.591*** 0.591*** 0.781*** 0.795*** 0.795***
(0.037) (0.059) (0.039) (0.04) (0.065)
      
Consumer expectations
0.244*** 0.244*** 0.139*** 0.132*** 0.132***
(0.042) (0.061) (0.039) (0.04) (0.019)
      
Unemployment
–1.858*** –1.858*** –0.362* –0.263 –0.263
(0.182) (0.288) (0.212) (0.217) (0.352)
      
Inflation
–1.662*** –1.662*** –0.815** –0.744** –0.744
(0.503) (0.336) (0.37) (0.371) (0.465)
      
Crisis
–5.757*** –5.757** –4.666*** –4.567*** –4.567**
(1.765) (2.458) (1.224) (1.225) (2.113)
      
ECB rate
–0.27 –0.27 0.605 0.652 0.652
(0.693) (0.86) (0.482) (0.483) (0.803)
      
ECB rate (shock)
3.239*** 3.239*** 1.923*** 1.836*** 1.836***
(0.623) (0.205) (0.48) (0.482) (0.458)
      
Cons 33.10*** 33.10*** 11.86*** 10.33*** 10.334
 (2.933) (5.865) (4.351) (3.178) (6.54)
      
Total R2 0.752 0.752 0.672 0.661 NA
Within R2 NA NA 0.823 0.823 0.823
Between R2 NA NA 0.442 0.414 NA
Pesarans test (p value) NA NA 0.000 0.000 NA
Observations        340
Source: Albinowski et al. (2014).
Note: The dependent variable is the net trust in the ECB. The first row of the table lists estimators used in the 
subsequent regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote the estimates’ significance 
at the 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) % levels.
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of a too early exit are much more frequent than concerns of a delayed exit, we are 
afraid that the exit will be neither timely nor ordered. However, this threat makes 
the research agenda we outline in the next section even more necessary.
6. CHALLENGES
The crucial process in a post-crisis economy is restructuring. Obviously, the bank-
ruptcy rate is not tantamount to the intensity of restructuring. Yet, it is worth noting 
that it was increasing in both the eurozone and in the United States only until late 
2009 and has since then been in a decline. In spite of the severity of the crisis, it 
fell below the multi-year average. Its fall in both economies has been followed by a 
deceleration in productivity growth. Have the fall in the bankruptcy rate and the de-
celeration of productivity growth been linked to unconventional measures in mon-
etary policy? Based on the current analytical framework, one cannot answer this 
question. Our guess is that they could have been. Even in the case of Poland, where 
interest rates have, until recently, remained clearly above zero, there exists indirect 
evidence suggesting that their exceptionally low level could contribute to the oc-
currence of zombie firms. Although between 2011 and 2014, the impaired loan 
ratio for enterprises did not increase (11.6% and 11.4%, respectively), the structure 
of overdue corporate loans changed remarkably. The share of loans 1–30 days past 
due in overdue corporate loans decreased from 37% in 2011 to 24% in 2014, while 
the same indicator for loans overdue for over a year increased from 36% to 49%. 
Simultaneously, the bankruptcy rate in Poland is low compared both to other coun-
tries and the multi-year average (cf., e.g., Coface 2014 and Creditreform 2012). It is 
also worth adding that the reallocation of production factors across sectors, which 
was of crucial importance for TFP growth in Poland until 2010, has contributed 
almost nil to that growth since then (Figure 9). If the enhanced banks’ tolerance 
for overdue loans and the fall in bankruptcy rate (or, more generally, slow produc-
tion factors reallocation) were indeed linked to exceptionally low interest rates, 
then omitting these links in conducting monetary policy would have deleterious 
consequences: persistently slow productivity growth, limited central bank capacity 
to influence aggregate demand, and thus a greater vulnerability of the economy to 
various negative shocks (more on this, see Ciżkowicz – Rzońca 2014.)
Another under-researched problem, in spite of its policy relevance, is the per-
sistence of uncertainty after the outburst of the global financial crisis (e.g. Haddow 
et al. 2013.) Uncertainty, like slow productivity growth, does not occur, or at least 
does not have to always occur unexpectedly. Central banks ought to learn more 
about the determinants of uncertainty as their changes strongly affect the banks’ 
ability to stabilise aggregate demand and thereby the economy.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
The paper provides a general evaluation of inflation targeting (IT) in Poland, with 
some reference to challenges faced by major central banks. 
–  Even though the NBP had been advised by international financial institutions 
not to adopt IT, that monetary policy strategy has proven to be relatively suc-
cessful in Poland. A bias towards the aggressive mitigation of inflationary risks 
seems to have contributed to that success. 
–  As the risk of the ZLB becoming a binding constraint is negligible in the case 
of Poland, the NBP does not have to search for a monetary policy strategy 
that would be better suited to cope with the ZLB. If price level targeting had 
been implemented in Poland instead of fully-fledged inflation targeting, policy 
response to actual shocks caused by the outburst of the global financial crisis 
would have deepened macroeconomic instability. In turn, even though the size 
of the revisions of nominal GDP was more limited in Poland than in the euro-
zone or the United States, the revisions have been considerable (and frequent) 
enough to disqualify that variable from being the nominal anchor. 
Figure 9. Contribution of production factors reallocation across sectors to TFP growth 
(2005–2011)
Source: Łaszek (2014).
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–  The benefits from the interruption of the post-EU accession boom in Poland 
through monetary policy tightening provide some support for a “leaning against 
the wind” approach to conducting monetary policy. 
–  The adverse impact of crisis occurrence on trust in the central bank provides 
yet another support for “leaning against the wind”, as without trust it is difficult 
for the central bank to “mop-up after”. That support is strengthened by some 
evidence pointing to the negative effects of aggressive interest rate cuts on trust 
in the central bank. 
–  The causes of slow post-crisis restructuring and persistent uncertainty con-
stitute another under-researched problem of great policy relevance after the 
global financial crisis. 
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